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Abstract 
We evaluate the effectiveness of a programme aimed at a group of unemployed 
in the capital of the South of Spain, within the framework of Active Labour 
Market Policies (almps). We use high quality administrative data which justifies 
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the application of propensity score matching methods. The estimated effects 
are positive with regard to employment, job security, and working hours in the 
short-term (6 months). However, this is not true in the long-run (36 months). 
No significant effects have been found on earnings, in neither the short nor 
long-term. Overall these results are quite robust with respect to the match-
ing algorithm choice and the potential influence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
Although, the short duration of the programme seems appropriate, the dis-
appointing long-term results highlight the difficulties of putting participants 
back into stable work in a context of high unemployment.
Key words: Unemployment, propensity score matching (psm), programme 
evaluation.
jel classification: J08, J60, C14, C52.
Resumen
Este trabajo evalúa el impacto de un programa dirigido a un grupo de desem-
pleados en la capital del sur de España, en el marco de las políticas activas 
del mercado de trabajo (pamt). Se han utilizado para ello datos administrativos 
de alta calidad, lo que justifica la aplicación de métodos de propensity score 
matching (psm). El efecto estimado es positivo en materia de empleo, seguri-
dad en el empleo y horas de trabajo, en el corto plazo (6 meses), pero no en 
el largo plazo (36 meses). No se ha encontrado un efecto significativo en los 
ingresos, ni en el corto ni en el largo plazo. En general, estos resultados son 
bastante consistentes con respecto al algoritmo matching elegido y la influen-
cia potencial de la heterogeneidad inobservada. Aunque la corta duración del 
programa parece apropiada, los pobres resultados a largo plazo reflejan las 
dificultades de los participantes para conseguir un trabajo estable en un con-
texto de elevado desempleo.
Palabras clave: desempleo, propensity score matching (psm), evaluación de 
programas.
Clasificación jel: J08, J60, C14, C52.
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Introduction
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of a local active labour market pro-
gramme using a very rich administrative data set. Unemployment is a clear 
example of a trigger event that may have important inequality-enhancing 
impacts (Gangl, 2006). The persistence of unemployment in European coun-
tries, especially in comparison to the United States, has thus drawn attention 
of academics and policymakers over the last few decades (Kluve and Schmidt, 
2002). The case of Spain is especially relevant in this respect. In particular, the 
South of Spain has shown a persistent differential in unemployment rates with 
respect to the rest of Europe, of at least 7 percentage points (Eurostat, 2009). 
This situation has in part determined the need to complement the unemploy-
ment subsidies of passive policies with active measures such as job search 
assistance, classroom or on-the-job training, subsidized employment, or self-
employment promotion. 1 
The effectiveness of the Active Labour Market Policies (almps) has been the 
object of intense debate in recent academic literature. From the theoretical 
point of view, they have emphasized that the positive effects on worker pro-
ductivity or improved job matching can be reduced by a “deadweight effect” 
arising from the workers who would have been employed in any case and by a 
“substitution effect” arising from the fact that the policy may lead to the sub-
stitution of some workers by others, without really generating any employment 
(Calmfors, 1994). From an empirical point of view, it has been noted that mea-
sured almp effectiveness depends on the specific country involved, the length 
of the policy, the characteristics of the participants, the programme type, and 
the evaluation methodology used (Dar and Tzannatos, 1999; Card, Kluve and 
Weber, 2010; Kluve, 2010). This uncertainty with regard to the effects of the 
measures, together with increased budget constraints, suggests the need to 
regularly evaluate labour market policies. 
We evaluate a short-duration combination programme (including training 
courses, labour orientation, and work placements) targeted at people who 
1 In fact, in the European Union (EU-15), spending on Active Labour Market Policies (almps) has increased 
significantly in most countries over the last few decades, reaching the point in 2005, when it represents 
between 0.44% and 1.58% of Gross Domestic Product (gdp) (in the United Kingdom and Denmark 
respectively) (oecd, 2009). Spain is no exception: its spending on active policies has increased from 
0.33% of gdp in 1985 to 0.78% in 2005 (oecd, 2009).
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enter from registered unemployment that was administered locally from the 
capital of Andalusia (Spain), with funding from the European Social Fund. We 
base our analysis on high quality administrative data, enriched with informa-
tion from two follow-up surveys. This informative data set justifies assum-
ing conditional independence in the application of propensity score matching 
methods. We claim that this is the best methodology we can use given the 
particularly rich set of control variables available.2 We are also able to consider 
different outcome measures (earnings, probability of employment, job secu-
rity, and working hours) and for different time periods (at 6 and 36 months 
since completion of the programme). 
Our results indicate that the programme presents positive effects on the partic-
ipants in the short-term (at 6 months), which are not maintained in the long-
term (36 months). These positive program introduction effects, much larger at 
the beginning than later on, have been previously reported by Blundell, Costa 
Dias, Meghir and Van Reenen's (2004) analysis of job search programmes in 
United Kingdom. The opposite result has been found for training programmes 
by Card et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis. It is difficult to compare our results to 
those of existing studies, though, because of the comprehensive nature of the 
programme under evaluation. Other combination programmes evaluated are 
not as comprehensive. For instance Winter-Ebmer (2006) reports positive short 
and long run effects on an Austrian combination programme involving training 
and job-search counselling, whereas Centeno, Centeno and Novo (2009) report 
small positive to negative effects on a similar Portuguese programme.3 
More specifically, estimated treatment effects are positive with regard to 
employment, job security, and working hours in the short-term. No signifi-
cant effects have been found on earnings, in neither the short- nor long-term. 
Most previous studies focus on just one or two outcome measures, gener-
ally employment probability, unemployment duration, and earnings, so our 
2 Convincing instrumental variables to deal with endogeneity issues of the treatment variable were not 
at hand, nor convincing thresholds for regression discontinuity designs. Nevertheless, as explained 
below, we test the sensitivity of results to the potential influence of unobserved factors. 
3 Note that some multi-treatment programmes may have been evaluated as combination programmes. 
(See for instance Sianesi’s (2004, 2008) evaluations of Swedish ALMPs or Heckman et al.’s (1998) and 
Plesca and Smith’s (2007) evaluations of the Job Training Partnership Act in the United States). But 
ours is a true combination programme which participants join as a whole.
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results are also difficult to compare in this regard.4 Nonetheless, in terms of 
the meta-analysis conducted by Card et al. (2010), our study belongs to the 
39.3% which obtain significantly positive impacts in the short term and 
the 40.0% which obtain insignificant effects in the long term.
We test the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the matching algorithm 
and the potential occurrence of unobserved heterogeneity. In fact, even though 
we are aware of the existence of previous work on these issues (for instance, 
Amuedo, Malo and Muñoz (2008) use different matching algorithms and Cali-
endo and Künn (2011) test for unobserved heterogeneity), to our knowledge 
our work is the first to present sensitivity results for the potential impact of 
unobserved factors for different matching algorithms.
Our paper adds to the literature in three important ways. First, we contrib-
ute to the rather scarce evidence that exists regarding the evaluation of pro-
grammes that boost employment in Southern Europe, and specifically in Spain. 
While international experience in evaluation is relatively wide, especially in 
The United States, Germany, and Northern Europe (Heckman, Lalonde y Smith, 
1999; Card et al., 2010), evaluation in Spain is relatively infrequent and very 
recent.5 However the Spanish labour market is characterized by a high and 
persistent unemployment rate, the highest in Europe (Saint-Paul, 2000)6. And 
additionally, Spain has experienced a significant increase in spending on almps, 
along with a significant regional decentralization of labour policies over the 
last decade (Cueto and Mato, 2009). In this regard, our findings are particu-
larly relevant to assess whether the effect of these policies in an economy 
with high unemployment rates and decentralized spending are similar to those 
implemented in other European countries, with lower unemployment rates 
and different degrees of centralization of labour policies. Second, we analyze 
4 Few studies evaluate more than one outcome measure. For instance Sianesi (2004) and Winter-Ebmer 
(2006) consider just two. To our knowledge, less than a handful of studies consider multiple outcomes 
(i.e., Hardoy, 2005; Cavaco, Fougere and Pouget, 2005; and Mato and Cueto, 2008). Nevertheless 
none of them consider simultaneously job security or working hours together with the more common 
probability of employment or earnings measures. 
5 To our knowledge, we can only name a handful of studies. We may cite Mato and Cueto (2008), Cueto 
and Mato (2009), and Arellano (2010), all analyzing training programmes. García-Pérez and Rebollo-
Sanz (2009) focus on regional wage subsidies, Malo and Muñoz-Bullón (2006) analyze measures that 
promote employment for the physically and mentally disadvantaged, and Ramos, Surinach and Artís 
(2009) cover a diverse group of active employment policies.
6 In fact, in 2009 it has the highest level of unemployment (18%) of all oecd countries (oecd, 2009)
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a comprehensive intervention programme, which includes training courses, 
labour orientation, and work placements. As previously stated, most previous 
studies refer to training or subsidized employment programmes in isolation 
and little is known about the likely consequences of combination programs 
such as the one we consider here. And finally, unlike most previous studies 
which focus solely on earnings or the probability of employment, given the 
richness of our administrative data, we are able to evaluate the programme’s 
effects on multiple outcome measures and for different time periods. Thus we 
are able to asses the programme impact in a more widespread fashion than 
usually found.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the institutional frame-
work of the Spanish labour market and the data used for the analysis. Sec-
tion II outlines our evaluation approach and Section III presents the findings. 
Section IV summarizes our results and concludes the paper.
I. Institutional Framework and the Data Base Used
Traditionally, the South of Spain has shown a persistent differential in unem-
ployment rates with respect to the rest of Europe, of at least 7 percentage 
points (Eurostat, 2009). In this context, the programme evaluated intends to 
favour the employability of those unemployed, by offering them a compre-
hensive support plan including orientation, training, and professional work 
placements. 
The programme is free and participation is voluntary. It is conducted and admin-
istered by local public officials. There are two main categories of actions: 1) 
specialized training, aimed at unemployed with different education levels, and 
2) training intended for groups in risk of social exclusion: immigrants, ex-drug 
addicts, long-term unemployed, and physically or mentally disadvantaged. 
Interested individuals apply for the specific action and public officials select 
participants based on the adequacy of their curriculum for the topic involved. 
High unemployment rates in Southern Spain guarantee a continuous supply 
of applicants. Selected participants benefit from a comprehensive interven-
tion action, which includes a training course (of approximately 350 hours), a 
paid internship (200 hours), and labour orientation, everything taking place 
during a period of three months. Thus, according to the classification used 
by Card et al. (2010), we are dealing with a combination programme of short 
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duration (less than 4 months) targeted at people who enter from registered 
unemployment. 
The dataset used in this analysis corresponds to the actions offered from Octo-
ber 2004 to May 2005. Our main source of information comes from the admin-
istrative details of programme applicants. In order to get additional information 
regarding the labour market status of participants and non-participants, two 
follow-up telephone surveys were carried out, one during 2005 and the other 
during 2008, at 6 months and 36 months approximately since completion of 
the programme.7 The total population comprised 990 subjects, 693 partici-
pants for the treated group and 297 non-participants for the control group. 
In the process of telephone interviews it was not possible to locate some of 
the individuals (as a result of changes in telephone numbers), thus the final 
sample observed was 520, 363 corresponding to the treated group and 157 
to the control group. As shown in Table 1, except for a minor reduction in the 
proportion of social exclusion actions and a slight increase in the proportion 
of high educated individuals, dropping those observations had virtually no 
impact on the characteristics of our sample. It is worth emphasizing that most 
applicants are highly educated relatively young women. This is no surprise as 
this group is usually considered as one of the most vulnerable to unemploy-
ment (Verick, 2009) and European large cities usually attract a disproportion-
ate share of highly-educated individuals (Carlino and Saiz, 2008).
Table 1. Sample Selection
 Treated Group Control Group All
 
Initial 
sample
Final 
sample
Initial 
sample
Final 
sample
Initial 
sample
Final 
sample
Sample size 693 363 297 157 990 520
Female sex (%) 79% 86% 81% 88% 81% 83%
Age (years) 30.39 29.60 30.96 29.37 30.15 30.45
Married (%) 28% 24% 27% 16% 26% 23%
Social exclusion case (%) 42% 38% 37% 26% 40% 34%
Individual’s educational level (%)
With no studies 5% 5% 4% 5% 5% 4%
Primary studies 26% 21% 18% 15% 24% 17%
Secondary studies 12% 8% 11% 4% 11% 9%
University studies 57% 66% 68% 76% 60% 71%
7 A translation of the questionnaire used in the phone surveys is offered in the Appendix. 
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Our outcome measures are employment probability, job security (measured as 
the probability of obtaining a permanent, instead of a temporary, contract), 
working hours (measured as the probability of getting a full-time, instead of 
a part-time, contract), and earnings. 
The profile of those applying for the programme shows that 83% are women, 
23% of which are married, with an average age of 30. On average, these women 
have a university degree and have been unemployed for 8.8 months. Only 14% 
of applicants have received state help (unemployment subsidy or some type 
of transfer from the State). 33% of the observations belong to applicants for 
actions aimed at groups in risk of social exclusion.
II. Methodology and Estimation Procedure
The aim of our analysis is estimating, in the terminology of Rubin (1974), the 
causal effect of the programme on the outcomes of a participating individual. 
Formally, let Y1 denote the outcome if the individual was enrolled in the pro-
gramme, and Y0
 , the outcome otherwise. Hence, for a given individual i, the 
impact of agency participation, i , is defined as:
 i i iY Y= −1 0  (1)
Suppose D is an indicator variable that equals 1 for individuals who partici-
pate in the programme and zero for individuals who do not participate. A 
variety of labour market impact measures can be estimated (Caliendo, 2006). 
However, we are mostly interested in the Average Treatment effect on the 
Treated (att), that is: 
  ATT E D E Y D E Y D= =( ) = =( ) − =( )1 1 11 0  (2)
which tells us whether, on average, unemployed participants benefited from 
joining the programme. The major difficulty in assessing the att originates in 
the complexity of evaluating E Y D0 1=( ) . This is known as the “Fundamental 
Problem” in the Evaluation Literature (Holland, 1986, p. 947), as the partici-
pants’ outcome which would have arisen in the case of their not participat-
ing Y0 cannot be observed.
Cristina Borra, Luis Palma, M. Carmen González y Luis F. aguado 101
Ideally, social experiments take persons who would otherwise participate in 
a program and randomly assign them to the participating (treatment) group 
or the non-participating (control) group. As a result of random assignment, 
under certain assumptions a simple comparison of the mean outcomes in the 
experimental treatment and control groups produces a consistent estimate of 
the impact of the program on its participants (Smith, 2000). Matching meth-
ods aim to recreate the conditions of randomness of a laboratory experiment 
by pairing off treated individuals with “similar” non-treated individuals. In 
order to do so, they rely on the Conditional Independence Assumption (cia), 
which implies that, conditional on a set of observable variables (X), assign-
ment between the treatment and control groups is random:
 
Y Y D X0 1,   (3)
In this way, remaining differences in the outcome variables are exclusively 
due to the treatment. The cia is thus crucial for correctly implementing match-
ing methods. The condition implies that all variables that influence treatment 
assignment and potential outcomes simultaneously have to be observed by the 
researcher (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Clearly, this is a strong assumption 
and has to be justified by the data quality at hand. 
In our view, the dataset used in this analysis contains sufficient information to 
ensure that the cia holds. In particular, our information complies with the rec-
ommendations for quality of matching by Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd 
(1998), as: a) the treated groups and the control groups share the same local 
labour market; b) the information comes from the same source questionnaire 
in both cases; and c) we have information regarding their work experience 
along with other socio-demographic data. Actually, our control group is made 
up of rejected applicants that were offered no other intervention and the fact 
that they also applied to the programme makes treatment and control groups 
more similar, also with respect to unobserved characteristics that may affect 
selection bias (Cueto and Mato, 2009; Raaum and Torp, 2002). Nevertheless 
we acknowledge that the selection process was not random. It was actually 
based on a personal interview and on the applicants’ observable character-
istics. We claim that after conditioning on those observable variables, there 
should not remain much selection bias. Nonetheless, we additionally perform 
a sensitivity analysis at the end of Section III to gauge the potential impact 
of unaccounted selection on unobservables.
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For the matching method to provide valid estimates of the impact of pro-
gramme participation, a further requirement besides independence is the 
common support or overlap condition. It ensures that persons with the same 
X values have a positive probability of being both participants and nonpar-
ticipants. Formally:
 
0 1 1< =( ) <P D X  (4)
The common support assumption implies that, for each treated individual, there 
is another non-treated individual who can be used as a matched comparison 
observation. While there is no formal test for the cia, the validity of the com-
mon support assumption can be tested. Figure 1 shows the propensity score 
histogram by treatment status.8 As can be observed, given the high degree of 
overlap between the two distributions, for the large majority of the treated 
individuals there is a similar control group individual, in such a way that the 
common support assumption is satisfied.9
Figure 1.  Distribution of Estimated Propensity Score by Treatment Status
8 The results of the underlying logit model are presented below. 
9 In the estimations, only three individuals are discarded. 
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As noted earlier, we need a large number of exogenous variables to ensure the 
validity of the cia. But conditioning on all relevant covariates is limited in the 
case of a high dimensional vector X. To deal with this dimensionality prob-
lem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest using the propensity score P(D = 
1 | X) =P(X), i.e. the probability for an individual to participate in a treatment 
given his observed covariates X. This implies measuring “similarity” between 
individuals with respect to their estimated probability of participation in the 
programme. Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) show that if potential outcomes 
are independent of treatment conditional on covariates X, they are also inde-
pendent of treatment conditional on the propensity score. 
Therefore, the first stage in the matching is to model the propensity score. 
Table 2 displays the results from the probit model of the likelihood of par-
ticipating in the programme. The results show that men were more likely and 
college graduates were less likely to participate in the programme. Because 
of programme design, the longer the unemployment duration, the higher the 
likelihood to be selected for the programme. Additionally, unemployed with pre-
vious placement experience were more likely to join the treated group. As can 
be observed, following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) only variables unaffected 
by participation (or the anticipation of it) were included in the model. 
Table 2.  Propensity Score Coefficient Estimates
Variable Coefficient St. Error
Female sex -0.2864 ** 0.136
Married 0.1025 0.146
University studies -0.3686 ** 0.172
Unemployment duration 0.0120 ** 0.006
Work experience 0.0215 0.139
Work placements 0.2827 * 0.155
Voluntary work -0.1799 0.141
Recipient of state benefit 0.2029 0.179
Special case -0.1055 0.162
Constant 0.8175 *** 0.211
Note: Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%.
In this type of evaluations it is equally convenient to analyze the quality of 
the matching between treated and non-treated individuals. Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) suggest that we check whether significant differences between 
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the average values of the variables for both groups exist after matching. Before 
matching we expect differences, yet after matching the variables should be 
balanced in both groups and significant differences should not persist. Table 
3 presents the mean values of the variables considered for both treated and 
controls, before and after matching. For the majority of the variables, match-
ing reduces the bias that exists between the distributions. The t-test rejects 
the null hypothesis of significant differences. However, the variable Second-
ary studies is worse after matching, with mean values for treated and controls 
turning significantly different. For this reason, the additional test of stratifi-
Table 3.  Matching quality
Variable
Unmatched Matched
Treated Control %bias t-test  Treated Control %bias t-test
Female sex 0.79 0.86 -19.1 -1.94 * 0.79 0.79 -0.1 -0.01  
Age 30.37 29.60 9.0 0.94  30.32 30.19 1.5 0.19  
Married 0.28 0.24 9.3 0.96  0.28 0.27 1.6 0.21  
With no 
studies
0.05 0.05 -1.8 -0.19  0.04 0.06 -8.9 -1.14  
Primary 
studies
0.26 0.21 11.7 1.20  0.26 0.28 -4.7 -0.61  
Secondary 
studies
0.12 0.08 15.1 1.52  0.12 0.08 12.8 1.68 *
University 
studies
0.57 0.66 -18.7 -1.94 * 0.57 0.57 0.3 0.03  
Time 
unemployed
9.61 7.01 20.7 2.05 ** 9.17 8.07 8.8 1.31
Work 
experience
0.75 0.73 5.7 0.60  0.75 0.74 3.5 0.47  
Time work 
experience
43.02 31.30 25.4 2.15 ** 42.50 36.03 14.0 1.53  
Work 
placements
0.54 0.54 -0.5 -0.06  0.54 0.52 3.3 0.44  
Time work 
placements
292.68 341.53 -19.9 -1.15  292.68 312.96 -8.3 -0.64  
Voluntary 
work
0.32 0.40 -15.5 -1.64  0.32 0.29 7.1 0.99  
Recipient of 
state benefit
0.15 0.12 9.4 0.97  0.14 0.14 0.8 0.11  
Social 
exclusion
0.41 0.38 7.9 0.82  0.41 0.43 -4.0 -0.54  
Note: Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%.
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cation suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (2002) was carried out. We divided 
the observations into sectors based on the estimated propensity score and we 
later checked whether within each sector significant differences in the dis-
tribution of each of the explanatory variables persisted. In the application of 
this test to our sample we obtained six sectors within which the distribution 
of the variables was balanced.10
III. Results
As already stated, we use different outcome measures for the calculation of 
causal effects: probability of employment, job security, working hours, and 
earnings. For these variables, we estimate att using different matching esti-
mators as sensitivity tests: Epanechinikov kernel matching, Gaussian kernel 
matching, and radius matching. Table 4 shows the estimation results, notice-
ably robust to different specifications. In the short-term (6 months), the effect 
of the programme is positive according to all the methods employed and for 
all the variables considered, although the result is not significant in the case 
of earnings. The individuals participating in the training programme present 
a greater employment probability (around 26 percentage points), job secu-
rity (around 28 percentage points) and probability of obtaining a full-time 
contract (around 23 percentage points). Calmfors (1994) points out at the 
potential decrease in job search intensity by programme participants whilst 
on the programme, what the literature designates as “lock-in effects”. We find 
no evidence of these adverse lock-in effects in our data. Given the relative 
short duration of the evaluated programme, it is very unlikely that adverse 
effects on search effectiveness and effort, such as those highlighted by Sian-
esi (2008), Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2007), or Cueto and Mato (2009), 
arise in our case. 
10 We used the procedure developed by Becker and Ichino (2002) for Stata. The results are available to 
any researchers that request them. 
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Table 4.  Average Treatment Effect on the Treated at 6 and 36 Months since  
Programme Participation
Variables
Epanechnikov kernel 
matching
Gaussian kernel 
matching
Radius matching
att
Standard 
error
att
Standard 
error
att
Standard 
error
Effect after 6 months
Employment 0.257*** 0.058 0.252*** 0.062 0.284*** 0.069
Permanent contract 0.276*** 0.083 0.253*** 0.075 0.310*** 0.090
Full-time contract 0.226*** 0.103 0.228*** 0.087 0.234** 0.116
Earnings 42.223 97.860 51.013 92.516 119.243 124.529
Effect after 36 months
Employment 0.514 0.070 0.042 0.060 0.046 0.074
Permanent contract -0.124 0.080 -0.140* 0.071 -0.143 0.099
Full-time contract 0.014 0.078 0.028 0.068 0.013 0.087
Earnings 2.790 65.020 -23.831 61.484 -30.221 79.639
Note: Significance level: *10%; **5%; ***1%. 
Standard errors are computed by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions.
In the long-term (36 months), however, the effect of the programme is by 
and large insignificant according to the different methods for the majority of 
the variables. Mato and Cueto (2008) also point out a reduction in the impor-
tance of the effects over time, although theirs is less dramatic11. Nevertheless, 
in our case, we can appreciate a negative and significant effect on job secu-
rity -measured by the probability of having a permanent contract-, for one of 
the methods. Caliendo (2006) also points out the existence of disappointing 
results for many groups of unemployed, explained by the existence of “stigma 
effects”. As this author argues, if the programme aims to favour people with 
disadvantages, there is always a risk that a possible employer takes partici-
pation in such schemes as a negative signal. According to our results, how-
ever, these stigma effects are not very robust and appear only after the initial 
short-term benefits of the program have vanished. 
11 In this respect, the Spanish case is contrary to the average international evidence, for which classroom 
and on-the-job training programs are not especially favourable in the short-run (Card et al., 2009).
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Taking both short- and long-term results together, we find in fact evidence of 
what Blundell et al. (2004) refer to as “positive program introduction effects”, 
which are much larger at the beginning than later on. This is in contrast with 
the evidence reported for training programmes by Card et al.’s (2010) meta-
analysis. Nonetheless the programme evaluated is a combination programme 
which offers not only training, but also job search assistance and work place-
ments. Apparently programme impacts are closer to Blundell et al.’s (2004) 
job search effects than Card et al.’s (2010) training effects.
One shortcoming of the propensity score matching approach is its reliance on 
cia. If participants and non-participants differ in terms of not only observed, 
but also unobserved characteristics, the cia is violated and therefore our results 
are biased. Following Caliendo and Künn (2011), we thus check the robustness 
of our results with respect to deviations from this assumption. Since testing 
the cia directly with non-experimental data is not possible, we address this 
problem with the bounding approach initially suggested by Rosenbaum (2002). 
This approach consists of simulating an unobserved component and testing to 
which degree of unobserved heterogeneity results are robust. The main idea is 
that in the presence of unobserved factors, identical individuals with respect to 
observable characteristics (Xi ) have different probabilities of receiving treat-
ment. Therefore, an artificial factor  is introduced to simulate an unobserved 
term. The influence of this unobserved term is gradually increased to assess 
its effect on the results by comparing the successful number of individuals in 
the treatment group with the same expected number, given that the treat-
ment effect is zero (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). 
Table 5 summarizes sensitivity test statistics for the average treatment effects 
of Table 4. Clearly, a sensitivity analysis for insignificant treatment effects is 
not meaningful and hence will be omitted. For the positive estimated treat-
ment effects, we report the test statistic q+ for the upper bound, under the 
assumption that we have overestimated the treatment effects and those 
who participate always have a higher employment probability or likelihood 
of having a permanent or a full-time contract even in the absence of treat-
ment. Conversely, for the only negative estimated treatment effect we pro-
vide the test statistic q– for the lower bound, under the assumption that we 
have underestimated the effect and those treated have a lower probability of 
having a permanent contract anyway. The test statistics are calculated for all 
three matching algorithms (Epanechinikov kernel, Gaussian kernel matching, 
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and radius matching). Besides the test-statistics and the respective p-values 
for different values of , we show the critical values of  at which the test 
statistic q+ turns insignificant with a 95% confidence level, thus implying 
that the treatment effects are actually due to unobserved factors. 
For all outcome measures considered, our departing point is a situation of 
no unobserved heterogeneity with  = 1.0. We then gradually increase the 
value of , to assess the potential strength of unmeasured influences. For the 
employment outcome variable, measured 6 months after completion of the 
programme, results are quite robust to unobserved factors. Critical values of  
are between 1.75 and 1.90 indicating that individuals with the same X-vector 
would have to differ in their odds of participation by a factor of 1.75 (1.90), or 
75% (90%) for treatment effects to turn insignificant at the 5% significance 
level. As for the estimated effects on job security and working hours, also at 
6 months since completion, results are slightly more sensitive to unobserved 
factors with critical values ranging from 1.15 to 1.30, depending on the match-
ing algorithm used. Finally, the negative estimated treatment effects for job 
security at 36 months since completion of the programme are very sensitive 
to potential unobserved heterogeneity. With just a 10 or 15% difference in 
the odds of participating of individuals with the same observed characteris-
tics, treatment effects turn insignificant. Therefore we feel quite confident 
on the robustness of our short-term probability-of-employment result, fairly 
confident on our short-term job-security and working-hours results, and quite 
unsure on our long-term job-security result. 
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this work we estimate the causal effect of a comprehensive active labour 
market programme on the probability and the quality of employment of par-
ticipating individuals, using propensity score matching techniques. Our fun-
damental result is the existence of positive programme introduction effects, 
that is, the programme has positive effects in the short-term which are not 
maintained in the long-term. These findings are quite robust with respect to 
the matching algorithm choice and the potential influence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
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Table 5.  Sensitivity to Unobserved Heterogeneity
After 6 months
Gamma Q+ p+ Q+ p+ Q+ p+
 
Epanechnikov kernel 
matching
Gaussian kernel 
matching
Radius matching
Employment
1.00 3.99 0.000 3.99 0.000 4.26 0.000
1.25 3.03 0.001 3.03 0.001 3.31 0.000
1.50 2.26 0.011 2.26 0.011 2.54 0.005
1.75 1.61 0.053 1.61 0.053 1.90 0.028
2.00 1.05 0.145 1.05 0.145 1.35 0.088
Critical value 5% 1.75 1.75 1.90
Permanent contract
1.00 2.12 0.017 1.96 0.024 2.06 0.019
1.25 1.47 0.071 1.31 0.095 1.43 0.075
1.50 0.94 0.173 0.77 0.220 0.93 0.173
1.75 0.50 0.309 0.32 0.373 0.50 0.308
2.00 0.11 0.454 -0.07 0.526 0.13 0.447
Critical value 5% 1.20 1.15 1.20
Full-time contract
1.00 2.36 0.009 2.25 0.012 1.93 0.026
1.25 1.71 0.043 1.60 0.055 1.31 0.095
1.50 1.18 0.119 1.07 0.143 0.80 0.213
1.75 0.73 0.231 0.62 0.267 0.38 0.353
2.00 0.35 0.362 0.23 0.407 0.01 0.496
Critical value 5% 1.30 1.25 1.15
After 36 months
Gamma Q- p- Q- p- Q- p-
 
Epanechnikov kernel 
matching
Gaussian kernel 
matching
Radius matching
Permanent contract
1.00 1.93 0.026 1.93 0.026 1.93 0.026
1.25 1.21 0.112 1.21 0.112 1.21 0.112
1.50 0.63 0.263 0.63 0.268 0.63 0.268
1.75 0.14 0.444 0.14 0.444 0.14 0.444
2.00 -0.03 0.511 -0.03 0.511 -0.03 0.511
Critical value 5% 1.10 1.10 1.15
Note: Results achieved by using mhbounds.ado (Becker and Caliendo, 2007). 
Critical values refer to the exact values of Gamma at which results turn insignificant at the 5% level.
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From a public policy standpoint the short duration of the programme seems 
appropriate, given the absence of lock-in effects. However, we find rather dis-
appointing long-term results. The more convincing explanation we can give for 
this fact is related to the difficulties of putting participants back into stable 
work in a context of high unemployment, as suggested by Sianesi (2008).12 
Probably in Spain, as in East Germany, almps can certainly not solve the deep 
structural problems in the labour market. They may alleviate the symptoms, 
but cannot cure the disease, as emphasized by Lechner and Wunsch (2009b). 
Overall, the Spanish institutional rigidity constitutes a challenging environ-
ment for any almp, certainly worth continuing to research and evaluate. 
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Appendix
From the University of Seville, we are conducting a study for the Project Redes, 
in which you participated in 2004 (or 2005, as appropriate)
 for the treatment group
From the University of Seville, we are conducting a study on the effectiveness 
of the Project Redes in promoting employability in Seville. Note that the data 
provided will be treated with confidentiality as required by law and in no case 
will be used for commercial purposes.
      for the control group
1.  Are you currently working?
2.  (If the person is working) Employed or self-employed?
3.  (If employed) Is it a permanent contract?
4.  (If working) What is your monthly income?
5.  (If not working) Do you study?, Are you actively seeking employment? Are 
you inactive?
6.  Only for treatment group: How useful is for you today having completed of 
the Redes course? Has it helped in finding work? (Current perception of the 
usefulness of the course) Rate of 1 (none) to 5 (to a very high degree)
